CANCELLED Séminaire vidéoconférence "Experiments in the Social Sciences" - Astrid Gamba (U. of Genova)


"Frustration and Anger in the Ultimatum Game"

13-02-2018 - 14h00 à 16h00 - Sophia Antipolis- Bât4 Géoazur- Salle de Vidéo Conférenrence


In social dilemmas choices may depend on belief-dependent preferences. We address this issue theoretically and experimentally in the context of the Ultimatum Minigame, assuming that the choice of accepting or rejecting an unfair proposal is affected by a combination of frustration, due to unfulfilled expectations, and inequity aversion. We increase the responder's payoff from the fair allocation (the proposer's outside option) with the purpose of increasing the responder's frustration due to the unfair proposal, and thus his willingness to reject it. In addition, we manipulate the method of play, with the purpose of switching on (direct response method) and off (strategy method) the responder's experience of anger. We found overwhelming evidence in support ofbelief-dependent preferences: in the direct method, the higher the responders' initial expectations of the fair allocation, the more likely they are to reject the unfair proposal. In line withour predictions, the direct method increases the conditional frequency of rejections. Instead, against our predictions, the payoff increase does not have such effect. Interestingly, the distribution of actions of male subjects is in line with the theory, but not that of females.

 More about Astrid Gamba



Partager cet article :