LEEM Seminar - Imen Bouhlel (UCA- GREDEG)

Two presentations : 1- Theoretical and experimental investigation of an individual search problem 2- Sharing is not erring: How environments can encourage pseudo-reciprocity in collective human search
Quand ? Le 16-01-2019,
de 12:00 à 13:00
Où ? Salle SCI - ISEM
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Please find below the description of the 2 presentations by Imen Bouhlel

Presentation 1:

Title: Theoretical and experimental investigation of an individual search problem

Authors: Imen Bouhlel, Michela Chessa, Agnès Festré and Eric Guerci

Abstract: Information search and opinion formation are central aspects of decision making in consumers choices. Indeed, before taking a decision, the alternatives among which the “rational” choice will be made should be clearly valued. In standard economic theory, the search dynamics is mainly neglected because the process is assumed to be carried out without any cost or without spending time. However, whenever only a significative collection of experience can provide the bulk of relevant information to make the best choice, some engendered costs in collecting such information might be considered.  Our paper lies on the conceptual framework for the analysis of an individual search task related to the consumption of a search good. In our model, we suppose that a best choice exists among a set of alternatives and the customer is willing to locate it. The total amount of time for searching is finite and the customer aims at maximizing the expected payoff given by an exploration-exploitation compromise. In the first part of our work, we theoretically model our situation as a class of stopping rule problems. By making different choices of the parameters, we are able to perform a theoretical analysis which embeds a large class of "traditional" (Seale et al, 1997; Zwick et al, 2003) and "new" ‘Erikson et al, 2010; Sang et al, 2011) optimal stopping problems. We particularly focus on a special case for which we present analytical and numerical simulation-based solutions. In the second part of our work, we test the results experimentally, and aim at explaining the gap between the observed behavior and the theoretical optimal stopping time in terms of regret, as well as individual differences in risk taking and impulsivity.


Presentation 2:

Title: Sharing is not erring: How environments can encourage pseudo-reciprocity in collective human search

Authors: Imen Bouhlel, Charley Wu, Nobuyuki Hanaki and Robert Goldstone

Abstract: Information sharing in competitive environments may seem counterintuitive, yet it is widely observed in humans and other animals. For instance, the open-source software movement has led to new and valuable technologies being released publicly to facilitate broader collaboration and further innovation. What drives this behavior and under which conditions can it be beneficial for an individual? Using simulations in both static and dynamic environments, we show that sharing information can lead to individual benefits through the mechanisms of pseudo-reciprocity, whereby shared information leads to by-product benefits for an individual without the need for explicit reciprocation. Crucially, imitation with a certain level of innovation is required to avoid a tragedy of the commons, while the mechanism of a local visibility radius allows for the coordination of self-organizing collectives of agents. When these two mechanisms are present, we find robust evidence for the benefits of sharing---even when others do not reciprocate. We then test these findings experimentally, where we investigate whether humans adapt their behavior to the different types of environments: those where sharing is beneficial, and those where it is not.