LEEM Seminar - Maxime David-Perodaud (UCA- GREDEG)

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Discrimination in markets for credence goods : experimental evidences

23-01-2019 - 12h00 à 13h00 - Salle SCI - ISEM

Title: Discrimination in markets for credence goods : experimental evidences

Authors: David-Perodaud Maxime, Hanaki Nobuyuki (UCA, GREDEG) and Takashi Yamada (Yamaguchi University)

Abstract: We experimentally investigate the relationship between gender and contextualization and provision behavior in experimental markets  for credence goods in a two-player, three-step game. Implementing a 2x4 design, we study how (i) revealing gender of the other player and (ii) framing affect outcomes and frequency of trade. We find evidence that overprovision and underprovision are firstly determined by financial incentives: the higher the incentives, the higher fraudulent rate. Our data also show that fraudulent behavior and frequency of trade are not fixed but instead context and gender-dependent. Extending the literature, we argue (in line with) that discrimination occurs in markets for credence goods.

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