Séminaire interne GREDEG - Gérard Mondello

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"The Unilateral Accident Model under a Constrained Cournot-Nash Duopoly"

12-04-2018 - 14h00 à 15h30 - GREDEG - Salle Picasso

Titre : "The Unilateral Accident Model under a Constrained Cournot-Nash Duopoly", co-écrit avec Evens Salies (Sciences Po, OFCE)

 

Abstract : This article extends the basic unilateral accident model to a competitive framework and compares strict liability and negligence under a Cournot-Nash duopoly. The latter is constrained by a generic input that serves for both production and safety purposes. The firms must arbitrate between both usages. The paper shows that liability regimes exert a crucial influence on the equilibrium determination. Strict liability leads to a higher output and fewer price cost but with higher risk than under negligence. When firms’ inner equilibrium allows it, both regime converge.

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